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There has been much discussion about the pace of land use change in recent decades especially 
in ex-urban areas of the country.
1 In many areas land use change has taken the form of forest or 
farmland converting to low density residential use. According to a government publication 
approximately 80% of the nearly 2 million acres of land recently used for new housing is located 
outside urban areas(Heimlich and Anderson, 2001). Although accurate statistics are difficult to 
obtain about the rate or amount of conversion in any particular area, the level of concern 
expressed by local governments in many states provides, at a minimum, indirect evidence for the 
prevalence of this land conversion issue. Many local governments have responded to this 
conversion activity by implementing policies to preserve land in openspace (farmland) or by 
enacting regulations to slow the pace of development; some have done both. Since 1988, over 53 
localities have passed more than $111 billion in conservation measures and these referenda have 
been exceedingly popular with over 75% of such measures passing (Trust for Public Land, 
2005). 
 
Changing land use patterns have spurred public sector concerns about environmental 
consequences and about the costs of supplying public services to a dispersed and fragmented 
population. But reliable research, attempting to explain the pattern of development as it unfolds 
over time and space and to test the success of land use policies aimed at altering that process, is 
hampered by two inherent features of the problem. The first is that widely available regional or 
national data sources on land use are notably unreliable at capturing low density residential 
development – the very type of land use of most interest. Both Census and satellite data 
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significantly undercount low density urban land (Irwin and Bockstael, 2004). The second is that 
usual empirical methodologies for modeling the effects of policies on development decisions 
encounter serious statistical identification problems. Because so many factors are correlated over 
time and space, identifying causation as distinct from simple correlation is a statistical challenge 
(Irwin and Bockstael, 2002). In this context, traditional regression techniques are often unsuited 
for teasing out cause and effect. 
This paper is one piece of a larger research agenda in which we explore ways of 
modeling the development decision and attempts to test the efficacy of policies aimed at 
affecting those decisions and the resulting development patterns. Our analyses do not depend on 
commonly used sources of national land use data, but instead on micro, parcel level data 
spanning a time horizon of slightly more than a decade. One focus of this research has involved 
testing for possible interaction effects among parcels, something that would be impossible with 
any other sort of data. 
If surrounding land use has an effect on the value of a parcel in a given land use, then it 
follows that surrounding land use will also have an effect on the likelihood of a parcel being 
developed. In the presence of such interaction effects, policies that alter development decisions 
can alter the likelihood of development of parcels other than those directly affected by the policy. 
The existence of interactions among neighboring parcels leads logically to path dependence in 
land use pattern change, but it also adds to the statistical identification problems alluded to 
above. 
The focus of this paper is a particular land use policy instrument - a land preservation 
program - that protects selected parcels from development, in perpetuity. We are specifically 
interested in the effect preservation of a parcel has on neighboring development decisions. If   Draft - 2010   
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interactions exist among these neighboring parcels then, depending on the sign of the interaction, 
preservation of a parcel may have indirect effects on neighbors, either reinforcing the protection 
of land or encouraging fragmented development. If the former is the case, then typical 
evaluations of preservation programs will understate their effect; if the latter, then preservation 
programs may have unintended consequences. Because preservation programs can legally target 
whatever types of land desired, they provide the public sector with an instrument that can affect 
long term land use patterns, but the ultimate effect may or may not be as expected. 
The Policy Environment 
Because of the nature of property rights in the U.S., a limited number of policy 
instruments are available to the public sector to affect land use pattern and land use change. Land 
use policies are implemented at the state or local level and so can vary considerably across 
regions of the country. However, all are subject to challenges under the ‘Takings Clause’ of the 
U.S. Constitution, which restricts the degree to which public actions are allowed to affect the 
market value of a parcel and therefore the extent to which direct land use control is possible. 
The study area for the empirical portion of this paper is the western portion of Howard 
County in the state of Maryland (see Figure 1), so we will use Maryland to illustrate the types of 
land use controls that are typically implemented in this region. While zoning ordinances serve to 
restrict the location of commercial and industrial uses, it is typically not possible to prohibit 
residential development except under very special circumstances (such as particularly extreme 
environmental conditions). Here we mention four common types of policies that attempt to affect 
the spatial pattern of residential development. In each case, the policies are designed so as to 
have differential effects across locations within a given locality.   Draft - 2010   
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•  Regulations that require different configurations of development in different regions of 
the locality. Zoning stipulates the maximum overall density of new residential 
development in any given area. In recent years, many counties in Maryland facing 
development pressure have attempted to protect rural areas by ‘down-zoning’ (reducing 
the maximum allowable densities) in order to make development less profitable in those 
areas. Some have also introduced the concept of clustered development. Although the 
total number of housing lots does not change, clustering either allows or requires smaller 
housing lots than would be implied by maximum allowable densities, but clustered on 
one portion of a parcel, leaving the remainder in non-built uses. Zoning regulations can 
also stipulate that a portion of the parcel be set aside in common open space, even if 
clustering is not required. 
•  Moratoria that temporarily slow development rates in specific areas. Adequate public 
facilities moratoria can be used by Maryland counties to close a school district to further 
development for up to three years if school capacity has been reached. 
•  Public works projects that encourage development in some areas by providing more 
public services. Chief among these is the provision of public water and sewer service, 
which reduces infrastructure costs of construction. 
•  Programs that support the public purchase of development rights of land parcels in 
specifically targeted areas. These include state and locally funded programs to purchase 
development easements from landowners and thus preserve chiefly agricultural lands, 
although forested lands can be preserved under these programs as well. 
We are particularly interested in this last policy instrument. For one thing, land preservation 
programs have become extremely popular throughout the U.S. In 2004, the American Farmland   Draft - 2010   
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Trust (2005) reported that over the previous 30 years, 53 state and local governments had 
preserved 1.67 million acres (.6 million hectares) at a cost of about $3.7 billion in public funds. 
A large number of public referenda aimed at funding farm and ranch land protection have been 
placed on local and state election ballots over the past five years and have experienced a 
surprisingly high rate of approval by tax-payers (Trust for Public Land, 2005). In response to 
concerns over loss of farm and forest lands, the Federal government authorized about $1 billion 
in matching funds to be spent over the period 2002-2006 to help fund local preservation 
programs. 
Maryland was the first to use this policy instrument and continues to be one of the 
leading states in preserving agricultural land both through its state program, funded by the 
Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, and through individual county programs. 
Howard County, the area of our study, has taken an active role in preservation. Over the decades 
of the 1980’s and 90’s, approximately 20,000 acres (8000 hectares) of the county were 
developed into residential uses but over 16,000 acres (about 6500 hectares) were preserved in 
either the state’s or county’s ‘purchase of development rights’ programs, with the latter 
accounting for most of the preservation activity. These 16,000 plus acres represent about 10% of 
Howard County’s land. 
Purchase of development rights programs invite owners of eligible parcels to offer their 
development easements for sale to a public agency. Eligible parcels cannot be located in areas 
served by public water and sewer service and must be at least 100 acres in size, or at least 25 
acres if adjacent to already preserved farmland. The price received for development easements 
follows a published formula based on characteristics of the parcel. Landowners interested in 
selling their easements apply to the agency, which then ranks applications according to a set of   Draft - 2010   
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stated criteria that overlaps significantly with the factors that enter the price formula. These 
include such attributes as parcel size, the level of agricultural activity on the parcel, ownership 
and operation of the farming enterprise, natural resource management activities undertaken, 
environmental characteristics of the land, the nature of land uses adjacent to the parcel, and the 
parcel’s zoning and road frontage. The county then extends offers to those landowners with the 
highest rankings until funds are exhausted for the given year.  
Over the life of the Howard County Agricultural Preservation Program, funding has been 
an issue. Parcels were preserved during the 1980’s under a lump sum payment option which 
limited the amount of enrollment due to the significant payments required from county coffers. 
In 1988 significant funds were appropriated (55 million) and again in 2000 (15 million), leading 
to easement purchases in 1990-97 and 2002 to the present, respectively. 
In addition to the funds injected into the program, financing and payment changes were 
made in 1988. First, the financing system was converted from a onetime payout to a tax free 
installment payout for 30 years and a balloon payment for the full easement amount at term end. 
From the landowners’ perspective this greatly eased the tax consequences of enrollment and 
from the county’s perspective this allowed the financial outlay to be spread across many years 
enabling more enrollments in each year. For example, a landowner with 100 acres receiving 
$6,000 an acre would initially have received a one-time easement payment of $600,000. 
Under the new terms, the landowner would receive a tax exempt payment each year of 6.5% of 
the easement value and at the end of the term a balloon payment of the full easement value, 
resulting in payments of over 1.7 million to the landowner but spaced out over 30 years. The 
county finances the payments by buying a bond to cover the principal amount, resulting in a first   Draft - 2010   
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year outlay of approximately $60,000 rather than $600,000. This new system has enabled the 
county to purchase many more easements per year than prior to the changes. 
The second major change concerned the funding source. As of 1988 the funding was tied 
to a 0.25% tax on real estate sales transactions, so that funding was secured via activity in the 
development market and future funding could be reliably forecast. Since 1988 no general fund 
monies have been used to purchase development rights. The maximum payment per acre was set 
at $6,600 in 1988
2, adjusted to $20,000 in 2001, and is currently at $40,000 an acre. 
From 1998 to 2000 the program had exhausted forecasted funds and no land was preserved.
3 
From the very start of the program, the county’s budget constraint was binding. Applicants 
whose parcels received a relatively low subjective ranking were either unable to preserve or 
experienced delays in the timing of preservation. Figure 1 shows the distribution of preservation 
activity over time. Arguably, recent decades represent the first time in history that the value of 
land in exurban counties exceeds the value of the productive resources of the land. This PDR 
program is designed to offer existing landowners the ability to extract some of the gains in land 
value that are ordinarily only accessible by converting land to development. 
When a landowner sells his development rights, into the Howard County or 
Maryland program, he does so in perpetuity. The preservation decision then becomes an 
alternative ‘terminal state’ to development. In any year, a landowner can choose to develop his 
parcel or preserve it (if the parcel is eligible for preservation). If either choice is made, the 
decision process ends. Or he can choose to keep his land in the current open space use and revisit 
the decision in the subsequent period. In an earlier paper Towe, Nickerson, and Bockstael (2008) 
consider the nature of the preservation decision as a competing alternative to development. 
                                                             
2 For comparison the estimated development value was $15,000 per acre at this time per the county documentation 
proposing the changes to the financing structure. 
3 A budgeting issue prevented enrollment in 1993 as well.   Draft - 2010   
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Specifically, they used an empirical realization of a real options hazard model of development to 
determine whether merely being eligible to sell development rights delayed the decision to 
develop. Here we pose a somewhat different question and test slightly different manifestations of 
it using a more appropriate estimation approaches. 
Interaction Effects of Neighboring Preserved Open Space 
The aim of this paper is to test whether an interaction effect exists between preserved parcels and 
neighboring development decisions. Specifically: does having a preserved neighbor alter a 
parcel’s likelihood of subsequently being developed? 
Although we have motivated the concept of interaction effects among parcels, it is useful 
to be a bit more precise. Define Yikt as an indicator variable equaling one if parcel i is found in 
land use state k at time t and zero otherwise. V(Yikt) is the value that parcel would have if it were 
in the kth land use at time t, where k indexes the set of uses that include undeveloped (possibly 
agriculture or forest) and developed (residential).
4 V(Yikt) is a function of exogenously 
determined characteristics of the parcel. These attributes vary over parcels and may vary over 
time. Interaction effects exist if V(Yikt) is also a function of Yjkt for all jЄJi where Ji is the set of 
parcels in the immediate neighborhood of parcel i. 
There are several reasons why an interaction effect may exist between developable 
parcels and preserved neighbors, none of which can be ruled out a priori. A farmer with a 
neighbor who has preserved his land in an open space use may find it more profitable to remain 
in farming for all the reasons that ‘right to farm’ laws have been instituted. Nuisance complaints 
from equipment noise, manure odors, and chemical releases are less likely to occur, and support 
industries are more likely to survive in the area. On the other hand, agricultural enterprises that 
                                                             
4 The possibility of developing land commercially in the areas of preservation eligibility is extremely 
limited, and the amount of actual commercial development in the western part of Howard County is so 
miniscule as to make residential use the only type of development worth analyzing.   Draft - 2010   
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depend on marketing to the public may find it profitable to have residential neighbors. 
Landscape horticultural enterprises and pick-your- own farm operations could possibly benefit 
from developments close by. 
The effect of a preserved neighbor on the profitability of development is equally 
uncertain. The proximity of services and shopping is often considered an advantageous feature 
for residential development and a greater mass of residential development is likely to encourage 
commercial services in the area. Thus the more preserved land in the area the less the critical 
mass of households and the lower the levels of services, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, 
neighboring land that is permanently preserved in open space could provide positive spillovers in 
terms of rural amenities (e.g. scenic views) and low levels of congestion and traffic noise. As the 
likelihood of development depends in part on a) the willingness to pay of households for housing 
in a given location and b) the profitability of the existing undeveloped uses (e.g. farming), the 
relative sizes of the potential interaction effects described above may be important in 
determining where development takes place. 
Testing a hypothesis about interaction effects is surprisingly difficult. Conventional 
regression-type analyses of land use interactions suffer from the sorts of identification problems 
that Manski (1993,1995) has found so prevalent in socio-economic behavior. Irwin (1998) and 
Irwin and Bockstael (2002) illustrate the problems that arise in trying to identify interaction 
effects between neighboring land uses. Because many of the factors that make development more 
or less profitable are spatially correlated, the empirical finding of more development adjacent to 
existing development is not evidence of a positive interaction effect. Such an outcome could 
easily arise simply because both parcels are characterized by similar levels of the factors that   Draft - 2010   
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affect development profitability, such as commuting distance to employment centers, road 
frontage, suitability of soils for development, etc. 
In testing whether preservation affects neighboring parcels’ likelihood of development, 
we will encounter these sorts of identification problems. Spatially correlated exogenous factors 
will increase the likelihood that neighboring parcels will adopt similar land uses. Thus finding 
empirical evidence of a negative relationship between preserved parcels and neighboring 
development decisions might simply be a manifestation of this spatial correlation in exogenous 
attributes. Several features of the county’s preservation program can be expected to exacerbate 
this tendency. Many of the developable parcels in our study set are, themselves, eligible for 
preservation. Spatially correlated features such as soil fertility, erosion, drainage, and other 
environmental characteristics alter the agency’s ranking of an offered parcel for preservation. In 
addition a kind of regulation induced interaction effect exists. Preservation ranking scores 
increase the more adjacent land is in open space uses, and increases even more if the adjacent 
land is preserved. Also eligibility requirements are less stringent for parcels neighboring already 
preserved land. 
All of these factors, either by accident or design, seem to increase the likelihood that 
parcels neighboring preserved parcels will themselves be more likely to preserve, if eligible. This 
together with the spatial correlation in factors affecting development suggests we are likely to 
find empirical evidence of a negative relationship between development decisions and 
neighboring preservation. The estimator proposed in the this paper attempts to measure the sum 
total of these spillover effects and only if strong positive spillover effects exist between 
preservation and development would one expect to find a positive empirical effect of 
preservation on development decisions.   Draft - 2010   
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The Study Area and Data  
Howard County, Maryland lies within commuting distance of Washington, DC and of 
Baltimore, MD – a medium sized industrial/commercial city. Its location has resulted in 
increasingly heavy development pressure, exacerbated by the ‘downzoning’ (to a realized density 
of no more than 1 house per 15-25 acres) that has taken place in a few adjacent counties. The 
character of the county differs considerably between east and west. The eastern section lies 
closest to Baltimore and to the major commuting routes to Washington and is zoned for much 
higher densities of development. It is served by public water and sewer service and, as a 
consequence, no land in the east is eligible for preservation. The western half is zoned either 
‘rural conservation’ or ‘rural residential’, with little distinctions between these two categories. In 
the west, development is allowed at a realized density of one house per 4.25 acres (1.7ha). Other 
than through zoning, the county has relied primarily on purchase of development easements in 
attempting to affect the spatial pattern of development in the west. Adequate public facilities 
moratoria were not invoked in the west during our study period. 
The data for this study consists of all undeveloped parcels in the western portion of 
Howard County that were developable into at least three residential lots as of 1991.
5 
Pooling several data sources – primarily property tax assessment data and GIS data from the 
county and state, including actual parcel boundaries – we were able to reconstruct the landscape 
as of the end of 1990 and identify at what point during the period 1991 through 2006 parcels 
were converted to residential developments.
6  The final data set includes 593 parcels, of which 
                                                             
5 A three lot conversion is considered a subdivision by Howard County and defining conversion in this way 
avoids counting the development of isolated family lots as a conversion of farmland to residential use. 
6 These data sources include the Maryland Taxation and Assessment Data for transaction data and most 
data on parcel characteristics; GIS parcel boundaries, zoning information and sewer service boundaries 
were provided by Howard County; and census data for tract and region specific variables. GIS data on 
roads was available from the State Highway Administration and GIS data on natural landscape features 
from the Maryland Department of Natural Resources.   Draft - 2010   
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242 parcels were also eligible for preservation at some time during the study period. The set of 
parcels included in the full data set are depicted in the map in Figure 2. Maps showing the spatial 
distribution of the number of parcels that actually preserved and developed each year during the 
study period are provided in Figures 3 and 4. 
Parcel attributes are included that measure factors that make development infrastructure 
more or less costly and attributes that make the parcel more or less profitable in currently 
undeveloped (eg. agricultural) use, as well as factors that affect gross returns relative to the 
baseline. To proxy for infrastructure construction costs we include the percentage of the parcel 
that is classified as steep grade (steep), the percentage of the parcel that is not suitable for road 
construction (notRoadSuit), the percentage of the parcel that is not suitable for septic field 
construction (notSepticSuit), and the percentage that is forested and would need to be cleared for 
development (forested). 
To capture the effect of returns in an agricultural use on the probability of development, 
we measure the percent of the parcel that was actively farmed at the beginning of the period 
(agriculture). We also include soil measures that reflect the quality of the soil for agricultural 
purposes. The percentage of the parcel in each of four soil classes is included, where class 1 
(class1) denotes soils that are prime for row cropping. The remaining soil variables (class2, 
class3, class4) are associated with declining soil quality for agricultural uses. The effect of these 
variables is measured relative to the worst soils for agriculture (the excluded soil category). 
Although the soil classifications could proxy for agricultural returns, good agricultural soils can 
also be favorable soils for development, so the expected direction of the effect on the hazard rate 
is ambiguous.   Draft - 2010   
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Other measures relating to the agricultural use include the log of parcel size (lnAcres) and 
the amount of surrounding land cover in agriculture (sAgriculture) and forest (sForest) within a 
100 meter buffer. The effect of the size of the parcel on the conversion decision is also 
ambiguous, as economies of scale may be evident in both farming and development.      
The gross returns from the development will be affected by the specific zoning 
requirements that vary only slightly over the two categories using a dummy variable to indicate 
an open space set aside  required by zoning that depends on size of parcel, environmental 
features, etc. (ospReq).
7  A dummy variable is also included when the existing parcel has a house 
(hsHouse) keeping in mind that development might entail changes to the current configuration of 
the parcel or existing infrastructure.  In addition we measure the distance (along road networks) 
to Washington DC from the center of the developable parcel (lndistDC), as well as the distance 
to Baltimore (lndistBA), the variables enter the model in log form.  
Our hypothesis is that surrounding land use may affect land values in alternative uses, 
then it follows that surrounding land use will also have an effect on the likelihood of a parcel 
being developed. In the presence of such interaction effects, policies that alter development 
decisions can alter the likelihood of development of parcels other than those directly affected by 
the policy. Simply stated surrounding land uses will impact the value of a parcel in development 
because people care about what is near to their house. People select homes based, in part, on the 
surroundings.  Some prefer forests while others parks, and some prefer to live in densely 
populated areas, while others prefer less congestion. Additionally, the existence of interactions 
among neighboring parcels leads logically to path dependence in land use pattern change. For 
                                                             
7 Assuming exogeneity of all these zoning regulations is reasonable for the study period, because the 
Howard County Comprehensive Plan and zoning codes were passed in 1990 and remained intact until the 
early 2000’s. 
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these reasons measures of the surrounding land uses are included as variables in the model to 
control for these interaction effects with neighboring parcels. 
  In measuring the surrounding land use variables, land uses are aggregated into 
eight categories: developable land with an existing house (e.g. a farmstead) 
(sluDevWithHs), developable land without an existing house (sluDevNoHs), 
commercial/industrial/institutional use (sluComm), subdivided land (but not yet built on) 
(sluSubdiv), preserved land (sluPreserved), not developable openspace 
(sluParkOpen) (e.g. public or privately supplied open space), roads (sluRoad) , and “fully 
developed” land in residential use (the normalized category). The surrounding land use measures 
are calculated as percentages of land within a 800 meter buffer around the true boundary of each 
parcel.
8  The normalizing category is land already in residential development, so that coefficients 
could be interpreted with respect to that land use classification. Finally, a dummy variable in 
included to indicate if the parcel has a neighbor that qualifies for an easement (sEasement) based 
on observed characteristics. A complete list of data and summary statistics for the anaylsis are 
given in Table1. 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
Perhaps the most appropriate way to test our hypothesis is to think of it in the context of a non-
random selection problem. In this framework, we wish to test for, and measure, our treatment 
effect where the observation of interest is a developable parcel, the treatment is the preservation 
of a neighbor, and the outcome of interest is whether the developable parcel is developed or not 
                                                             
8 As examples, exempt classes include schools, churches, government office buildings, public works operations, etc. 
Commercial and industrial uses include retail stores, manufacturing plants, warehouses, office buildings, etc. 
Although surrounding land use results are sensitive to the use of different radii, 
e.g. 400 and 100 meters, we have used a larger buffer to represent the landscape variation within a wider 
“neighborhood” of influence likely to affect development activity for years to come.  
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over a specified time period following the preservation action. This is a non-random selection 
process because, as we have argued, developable parcels that have preserved neighbors are likely 
to have, on average, different characteristics than parcels without such neighbors, and these 
different characteristics may alter the likelihood of development. Conventional analyses, such as 
the hazard models utilized in previous work by Towe, Bockstael, and Nickerson, attempt to 
control for characteristics by entering them, together with the treatment variable, into a 
regression-type model that seeks to explain the outcome. But criticisms of this type of approach 
are now common when selection issues are prevalent. Alternatives for improving the rigor of the 
statistical test include procedures that estimate treatment effects by matching treated and 
untreated observations on conditioning variables. Such matching methods allow non-parametric 
estimation of treatment effects, removing sensitivity to functional form and exposing violations 
of the common support – cases where treated observations are substantially different from 
untreated observations. In the context of regression-type analysis, such violations remain 
undetected and can result in treatment effects being extrapolated solely on the basis of functional 
form because non-treated observations that are similar to treated ones do not exist. 
Here we draw on a class of estimators called propensity score matching estimators, first 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). Applications of propensity score matching are now 
quite prevalent in the literature, especially in labor economics where the evaluation of job 
training programs represents a significant challenge (e.g. Smith and Todd, 2005a, Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2003). Before explaining the specifics of our own application, we lay out the general 
form of the matching estimation procedure following such standard references as Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1997); Heckman, Ichmura, Smith and Todd (1998); and Smith and Todd 
(2005a). To present the general format of the problem, let N be the number of developable   Draft - 2010   
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parcels at time TT, when the treatment is observed. N1 of these parcels are treated, where 
treatment is defined as the preservation of a neighbor during time period TT. Outcomes emerge in 
some period subsequent to TT. We will be implementing this evaluation technique for three 
variants of our problem, so will postpone defining precisely both ‘treatment’ and ‘outcome’ until 
we can discuss these variants. 
Following common notation, Y1 is the outcome under treatment and Y0 is the outcome 
with no treatment. For any parcel, only one of these outcomes can be observed. D = 1 indicates 
that a parcel has been treated and D=0 indicates the untreated state. Z is a vector of K 
conditioning variables. These are variables that we expect would affect the probability of 
treatment (i.e. the probability that a given developable parcel would have a preserved parcel as a 
neighbor) and variables that can be expected to affect the outcome (the development decision) 
directly. These latter variables are the ones included in the vector X of previous sections. 
The usual task set out by propensity score matching procedures is to estimate the mean 
‘treatment effect on the treated’ or the ‘average treatment for the treated’ (ATT). For our 
problem, this is the effect on the likelihood of development of having a preserved neighbor, 
averaged over all parcels that were treated in this way. Specifically, we want an estimate of 
(1)                        ATT = E(Y1 –Y0 | Z, D=1) = E(Y1 | Z, D=1) - E(Y0 | Z, D=1) 
where ATT is the average treatment effect. This equals the expected value of the difference 
between the treated outcome and the non-treated outcome, conditional on exogenous explanatory 
factors, Z, for the group of parcels that are actually treated. The first term in the last expression in 
(1) is easily obtained, as it is the average actual outcome for the treated observations – in our 
case, the proportion of treated parcels that develop. However the second term represents a   Draft - 2010   
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counterfactual. It is the expected outcome for the treated observations had they not been treated. 
The task is to define an estimator for E(Y0 | Z, D=1). 
Matching estimators pair each treated observation with one or more observationally 
similar non-treated observations, using the conditioning variables, Z, to identify the similarity. 
This procedure is justified if it can be argued that conditional on these Z’s, outcomes are 
independent of the selection process. That is, if those observations found in the set D=0 were 
actually treated, the expected value of their outcomes, once conditioned on the Z’s, would not 
differ from the expected value of outcomes in the treated group. 
More precisely, conditional mean independence is required, such that 
(2)          E(Y0 | Z, D=1) - E(Y0 | Z, D=0) 
We also need the additional condition that there is no single Zk or combination of Zk’s that 
guarantees treatment. Put another way, for any set of the Z’s, the probability of treatment is 
strictly less than 1, i.e. Pr(D = 1| Z) < 0. This must be true for each treated observation to have 
the potential of an analogue among the untreated. 
Direct implementation of the above would be difficult for a large number of conditioning 
variables, yet ensuring that (2) holds would typically require a rich set of these variables. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin defined the propensity score matching estimator by showing that instead 
of conditioning on all K elements of the Z vector, one can equivalently condition on a one-
dimensional function of that vector. They show that if outcome Y0 is independent of selection 
when conditioned on the Z’s, then it is also independent of selection when conditioned on the 
‘propensity score’ which is defined as the probability of selection conditioned on the Z’s. 
Defining 
(3)                                 P(Z) = Pr(D=1|Z),   Draft - 2010   
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the treatment effect in (1) combined with equation (2) can now be rewritten as: 
(4 )   ATT = E(Y1 –Y0 | P(Z), D=1) = E(Y1 |P( Z), D=1) - E(Y0 |P( Z), D=0) 
 In practice, (3) is estimated as a binary probit or logit, with treatment as the dependent variable. 
Explanatory variables include factors that are expected to affect the probability of treatment and 
those that are expected to affect outcomes directly and may be correlated with treatment. 
Having established the grounds for matching, we need to define the form of the matching 
estimator for the treatment effect in (4). The general form of this estimator is: 
(5)                                    ￿￿￿=1￿1￿∈￿1￿1￿−￿∈￿0￿￿￿￿0￿ 
where I1 is the set of treated observations and I0 is the set of untreated observations. Wij denotes 
weights applied to the elements of the untreated observations’ outcomes when constructing a 
counterfactual for treated outcome i. These weights will depend on the size of the difference 
between P(Zi) and P(Zj). The simplest matching estimator is the nearest neighbor estimator in 
which Wij equals 0 for all untreated observations except the observation with the propensity score 
closest to treated observation i’s propensity score. Thus nearest neighbor matching is a pairwise 
matching scheme that selects the counterfactual from the untreated set on the basis of the most 
similar propensity score. 
Other matching estimators construct the counterfactual using information from more than 
one untreated observation, weighting by some function of P(Zi) - P(Zj) where i’s are treated 
observations and j’s are untreated observations. Defining Wij in the following general way 
produces a kernel estimator: 
(6)                                                   ￿￿￿=￿￿￿(￿￿)−￿(￿￿)ℎ￿∈￿0￿￿￿(￿￿)−￿(￿￿)ℎ,   Draft - 2010   
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where h is the bandwidth of the kernel and Kn is some kernel function of the difference in 
propensity scores between the treated and untreated observations divided by the bandwidth. We 
use the Epanechnikov kernel for this analysis where the kernel function is given by: 
(7) ￿￿￿=0.75(1−0.22)5  if |z|<5 and 0 otherwise where ￿=￿￿￿−￿￿￿ℎ. 
One strength of propensity score matching is that it exposes regions in which the support of Z 
does not overlap for treated and untreated observations. For example, there may be no untreated 
observations with propensity scores in the range of high values of P(Zi). When this is the case, 
the matching procedure is defensible only over the region of the common support. As an 
example of how the common support issue might arise in this data, consider the case where a 
parcel has attributes that make it highly valued as a subdivision and then has a neighbor that 
enters the preservation program. If a parcel with similar attributes but no bordering preservation 
does not exist in the data set, then the counterfactual does not exist and non-parametric 
identification is not possible. This is referred to as failure of the common support. Treated 
observations outside the common support are dropped from the analysis, and the ￿￿￿ is now an 
estimate of the effect of treatment on the treated only over the range of the common support. 
Application of Propensity Score Matching to the Land Use Problem 
Three experimental evaluations are implemented. In each the treatment is defined as the 
preservation of a neighbor during the years 1990-1992.
9 This particular treatment definition was 
selected in part because a large group of parcels were preserved in 1990-1992. The three 
alternative outcomes are a) whether the parcel was developed during a short run period (from 
1992 through 1997), b) whether the parcel was developed during in a longer term period (from 
1992 through 2001), and c) whether the parcel was developed during in an even longer run 
                                                             
9 Data on all preservation decisions back to the program’s inception in the early 1980’s are available, allowing 
inclusion of 1990 as well as 1991 preservation decisions in this treatment. Data on development decisions are 
available only from 1991 onwards, however.   Draft - 2010   
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period (from 1992 through 2006), all following a neighboring preservation action. The 
observation set includes any parcel in the western part of the county that was developable as of 
1991. Subsequent development decisions during the duration of the study period can then be 
examined. 
The first step of the procedure is to calculate the propensity score by estimating the 
probability that a parcel is treated as a function of factors that affect the likelihood of treatment 
and factors that affect the outcome (i.e. development). The factors that are hypothesized to affect 
the likelihood of treatment are almost identical to those that have already argued should affect 
the development decision. However, a treated parcel is one that has a preserved neighbor, not 
one that is preserved itself. Nonetheless, parcel attributes are identified that are expected to affect 
preservation decisions to determine how they may be reinterpreted as factors affecting treatment. 
Recall that Howard County sets out specific criteria for ranking parcels for easement 
purchases. The county assigns a higher score to the application,  
•  the more agricultural or forested land in the vicinity of the parcel 
•  the more active the agricultural operations on the parcel; 
•  the more protected land in the area; 
•  the larger the parcel size; 
•  the greater the proportion of LCC class 1, class 2, and class 3 soils on the parcel; 
•  and the greater the road frontage; 
Although these criteria are intended to apply to the parcel being considered for preservation, 
many are characteristics that apply to that parcel’s surrounding land use or characteristics that are 
likely to be spatially correlated factors and therefore similar among neighboring parcels. 
Therefore, there is every reason to expect a selection problem. To be more specific, in attempting   Draft - 2010   
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to measure the effect on parcel A’s development decision from having a neighbor, B, preserve, 
one needs to take into account the fact that features of the landscape that make B more likely to 
preserve will be a land use description of the neighborhood of both A and B, as well as physical 
and environmental characteristics of B that are likely not to vary much across the neighborhood 
of A and B. And, what is more, these very features are factors likely to affect the probability of 
development, as well. The variables that should help explain the probability of treatment clearly 
overlap almost exactly with the set that affects the development outcome. Fortunately, propensity 
score matching does not require separating out the effects of various explanatory variables on the 
outcome and the likelihood of being treated, but only that the analysis controls for them in 
testing for the treatment effect. Because of this, matching methods for estimating treatment 
effects seem particularly well-suited to deal with this otherwise confusing and confounding 
problem. 
 Results 
The results of the initial specifications of the probit estimation are given in Table 2.  
Interpretation is complicated by the fact that the variables are measured for the developable 
parcel and are included to explain whether that parcel is treated in the sense that a neighbor 
preserves. The probit does not directly estimate the probability of preservation but instead the 
probability of treatment, but these will be similar for variables that are correlated in space. 
Fortunately, interpretation of net effects is not necessary in constructing propensity scores and 
correlation among covariates causes no particular problems. 
Once having obtained the propensity scores, the common support condition can be 
examined. Figure 5 provides the histogram of propensity scores for the treated and non-treated 
groups for the quasi-experiments. The x-axis measures the value of the predicted propensity   Draft - 2010   
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score, calculated from the results of the probit analysis. The yaxis measures the percent of each 
sample (treated and non-treated) found in each predicted propensity score interval of 
approximately 5 percentage points. Intervals for which there are treated observations but no non-
treated observations available for controls are intervals over which the common support fails. 
Before calculating the average treatment on the treated, ￿￿￿ , the outcome must be 
shown to be mean independent of the treatment, conditional on the propensity score. Given the 
conditional independence assumption set out in (2) above, this requires ensuring that the 
covariates in Z meet this condition, which is equivalent to achieving 'balance' between treatments 
and their controls. In layman’s terms, balancing ensures that covariates in Z cannot be used to 
predict membership in the treatment or control group, i.e. the ideal situation of a random 
assignment has been recreated.  
Several balancing tests exist in the literature. The test used in this paper – commonly 
called regression based balancing – is suggested by Smith and Todd (2005a) and explained in 
more detail in Smith and Todd (2005b). The intuition behind this test is that after conditioning on 
P(Z), any further conditioning on the Z vector should not provide new information on D, the 
treatment assignment. In other words, the balancing tests evaluate whether covariates in Z are 
informative of treatment assignment after conditioning on the propensity score.
10 If differences 
remain, then this suggests the propensity score model is mis-specified. Following Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002), cross products and squares of covariates are added to the specification until 
balancing is achieved. 
                                                             
10 Operationally, each covariate in regressed on the propensity score, the treatment dummy, the propensity score 
squared and cubed, and the propensity score, squared and cubed, interacted with the treatment dummy. The F test of 
all variables containing the treatment dummy equal to zero provides the test statistic. 
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Two features of balancing are important to note. First, it may not be possible to achieve 
balancing in some problems. Second, the balancing test does not provide a means of selecting 
conditioning variables; it only assures that any predictive power of treatment classification in the 
selected variables is squeezed out of the set of variables that is available. After balancing the 
covariates in Z, the propensity score calculated from Z is no longer informative as to which 
parcels are in the treatment or control group. In essence the procedure has recreated a random 
experiment. The final specification passes the balancing test suggested by Smith and Todd, when 
applied to the observations in the common support.
11 
The treatment is defined as having a neighbor that preserves in 1990-92, and the short run 
outcome measure is conversion after treatment and before 1997.
12 The eligible set includes only 
those developable parcels not treated before 1990 and includes 593 observations of which 10 are 
dropped because of a common support violation and 132 remain in the treated set. The remaining 
developable parcels are in the control set. Table 3 reports the number of treated and untreated 
(control) observations for set of quasi-experiments and the number of observations that fall on 
the common support. 
The results of the matching tests for each outcome time lag are found in Table 4. 
The first column reports information about actual outcomes – specifically the percent of treated 
and untreated parcels that ultimately develop within each specified time frame. For example, for 
the short run timeframe, 12.7% of the sample of parcels with neighbors that preserve in 1990-92 
developed in the period from 1992 to 1997. 
In contrast, 10.9% of those parcels that were not treated developed between 1992 and 1997. For 
the 10 time horizon there appears to be little difference, 18.18% of the sample of parcels treated 
                                                             
11 Output for the balancing tests is quite lengthy and thus available by request. 
12 Of course, a parcel which converts then is treated is considered in the control group.   Draft - 2010   
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ultimately developed by 2001 and 18.31% of the untreated developed.  A similar pattern is 
observed for the 15 year time horizon. 
The column marked ‘Kernel Estimated Mean’ reports matching results for the 
Epanechnikov kernel matching algorithm. The first number reports the proportion of treated 
parcels that ultimately develop for the parcels that remain after eliminating those treated 
observations that violate the common support condition. The second item in this column reports 
the mean counterfactual. This is a re-weighted average value of the binary outcome, where the 
weights are defined as in equation (6). Recall that the results from the “Unmatched Means” 
illustrate that the difference between the percent of actual treated and untreated parcels that 
subsequently convert is small, in both the short and longer run experiments. These differences 
are not statistically different at even the 10% level and suggest that treated parcels show no 
greater propensity to develop than do control parcels. 
However, when the matching procedure is employed which involves limiting the treated 
set to those on the common support and comparing these treated parcels only with similar control 
parcels, the difference is much larger (7.5 percent, 10.62 percent, and 7.8 percent for the short 
and longer term experiments, respectively). This suggests that parcels that neighbor preservation 
were more than twice as likely as their control counterparts to develop within the short run 
period of five years as well as the longer term period of 10 years following neighboring 
preservation. In the 15 year timeframe the differences are approximately 33% greater for treated 
parcels this decline in the difference in treatment effect with the longer time horizon may 
suggests that any effect due to neighboring preservation declines with time but also may be a 
byproduct of prediction so many years into the future.  To determine significance of the ATT   Draft - 2010   
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estimates, bootstrapped standard errors are calculated with 1,000 repetitions. In both the mid and 
long term cases, the ATT  is significant at the 5% level. 
Table 5 illustrates the ability of the matching estimator to mimic a controlled experiment. 
First compare columns 2 and columns 3 which are the raw means of the covariates by treatment 
status. There are large differences in the acreage (lnacres), amount of land in agriculture 
(agriculture), percentage of lands with steep slopes (steep), surrounding lands in farmsteads 
(sluDevWithHs, sluDevNoHs), as well as easement eligibility of the own parcel and neighbors’ 
parcels (sEasement). 
Columns 3 and 4, under the heading “After Matching”, display the same variables limited 
to the common support and using the weighted control observations. Notice the similarity now 
between the log of acreage (3.773 acres for the treated versus 3.752 acres for controls), 
percentage of land in agriculture (67.995% treated versus 67.466% controls), amount of 
surrounding lands in farmsteads (24.3% versus 24%), and neighbors’ pre-existing easement 
eligibility (54.5% versus 54.1% controls). In summary, this table illustrates the power of the 
matching estimation procedure to convert a non-random assignment problem into one that 
approaches a randomized method. It compares treatment and weighted control observations that 
are very similar in observable covariates addressing the selection problems inherent in 
enrollment and the reliance on the functional form of a regression approach to evaluate a 
treatment outcome. 
Conclusion 
Testing the effects of policies and programs on land use decisions is not an easy task. This is 
especially true when the effect being tested is some type of spatial interaction. Because the 
landscape is characterized by so much spatial correlation, it is empirically difficult to distinguish   Draft - 2010   
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between true interactions between outcomes, and outcomes that are correlated because they are 
affected by correlated exogenous variables. In other words, it is difficult to provide evidence of 
causation as opposed to correlation. 
Following matching methods developed in the labor literature, propensity score matching 
is used to test for a treatment effect. In the matching framework, three outcomes are considered, 
one that tests the effect of the preservation actions on subsequent development in the short run or 
5 years,  a second that allows the effect to be measured within a 10 year window, and a third 
using a 15 years outcome window. The propensity score matching method reveals significant 
effects from treatment. Parcels with preserved neighbors are significantly more likely to develop 
subsequent to their neighbor’s preservation than those without such a treatment. The difference 
in the calculated treatment effect in the short and long run experiments is small suggesting that 
the spillover effect occurs relatively quickly and remaines stable into the long run. The size of 
the effect is estimated to be about 7 and 10% - that is developable parcels in the western part of 
Howard County are approximately twice as likely to developable if a neighbor preserved than a 
counterpart with no preserving neighbor. 
This paper provides evidence for the contention that preserved open space is likely to 
induce more neighboring development, holding other things equal. Thus preservation programs, 
if not designed carefully, may actually encourage landscape fragmentation by setting in motion a 
path dependent process that encourages a checkerboard pattern of preservation and development. 
Knowing of the existence of this spillover effect may help the public sector design land use 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics   
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
lndistDC  593  3.906  0.199  3.385  4 
lndistBA  593  3.656  0.185  3.186  4 
notSepSuit  593  43.468  26.880  0.000  100 
notRoadSuit  593  36.283  20.620  0.000  100 
steep  593  9.664  21.220  0.000  99 
sluDevWithHs  593  0.259  0.105  0.000  1 
sluDevNoHs  593  0.240  0.117  0.016  1 
sluComm  593  0.012  0.029  0.000  0 
sluSubdiv  593  0.064  0.045  0.000  0 
sluPreserved  593  0.090  0.128  0.000  1 
sluRoad  593  0.042  0.036  0.003  0 
sluParkOpen  593  0.003  0.008  0.000  0 
class1  593  3.323  7.663  0.000  67 
class2  593  53.723  21.953  0.000  100 
class3  593  25.150  16.043  0.000  85 
class4  593  13.629  18.080  0.000  86 
slcForest  593  0.362  0.312  0.000  1 
slcAgriculture  593  0.458  0.345  0.000  1 
forested  593  33.137  31.168  0.000  100 
agriculture  593  56.390  34.238  0.000  100 
lnacres  593  3.566  0.799  1.457  6 
sEasement  593  0.347  0.477  0.000  1 
hsHouse  593  0.486  0.500  0.000  1 
ospReq  593  0.705  0.456  0.000  1 
 




Table 2: Propensity Score Estimates 
Variables  Coef  Std Err  P>|z| 
lndistDC  1.590  3.060  0 
lndistBA  -0.690  -1.400  0 
notSepSuit  -0.001  -0.180  1 
notRoadSuit  0.003  0.510  1 
steep  -0.009  -1.670  0 
sluDevWithHs  1.907  2.180  0 
sluDevNoHs  5.667  6.740  0 
sluComm  0.445  0.120  1 
sluSubdiv  2.269  1.180  0 
sluPreserved  3.871  5.330  0 
sluRoad  -5.957  -2.280  0 
sluParkOpen  -2.034  -0.190  1 
class1  -0.014  -1.110  0 
class2  -0.004  -0.440  1 
class3  0.009  0.930  0 
class4  -0.001  -0.080  1 
slcForest  -0.302  -0.300  1 
slcAgriculture  0.333  0.920  0 
forested  0.010  1.320  0 
agriculture  0.008  1.110  0 
lnacres  0.044  0.330  1 
sEasement  0.375  1.910  0 
hsHouse  0.080  0.530  1 
ospReq  0.064  0.280  1 
_constant  -8.050  -2.730  0 
       
Observations  593     
Psuedo R2  -0.3198     
 
 






Treated  132  10 
Controls  451  0 






Table 4 Average Treatment Effects 








Treated  12.7  13.64 
Controls  10.9  6.17 
Difference  1.8  7.5* 
     







Treated  18.31  19.70 
Controls  18.18  9.08 
Difference  0.13      10.62** 
     







Treated  20.42  21.97 
Controls  21.51  14.17 
Difference  -1.09       7.80** 
Note: Significance levels based on 1,000 bootstrapped  
repetitions are: **: 5%, *10%. 









Table 5  Summary Statistics by Treatment Status 










Variable  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
lndistDC  4.000  3.876  3.994  3.988 
lndistBA  3.696  3.644  3.695  3.692 
notSepSuit  38.057  45.171  38.250  40.267 
notRoadSuit  35.284  36.598  35.387  37.290 
steep  4.373  11.329  4.356  4.880 
sluDevWithHs  0.237  0.266  0.243  0.240 
sluDevNoHs  0.304  0.220  0.300  0.305 
sluComm  0.006  0.014  0.007  0.007 
sluSubdiv  0.053  0.067  0.054  0.052 
sluPreserved  0.172  0.064  0.161  0.157 
sluRoad  0.031  0.046  0.032  0.032 
sluParkOpen  0.001  0.004  0.002  0.002 
class1  3.594  3.237  3.725  3.302 
class2  51.892  54.300  52.131  52.454 
class3  26.820  24.624  26.256  26.413 
class4  13.642  13.625  13.591  13.129 
slcForest  0.297  0.382  0.292  0.295 
slcAgriculture  0.592  0.416  0.591  0.589 
forested  27.921  34.779  27.330  27.798 
agriculture  67.687  52.840  67.995  67.466 
lnacres  3.795  3.493  3.773  3.752 
sEasement  0.577  0.275  0.545  0.541 
hsHouse  0.423  0.506  0.432  0.488 
ospReq  0.810  0.672  0.795  0.782 
         
Observations  142  451  132  451 
Weighted Number of Observations  132 




Figure 1 Study Area 
 
 




Figure 2 Preservation Activity 






Figure 2: Spatial distribution of Developable Parcels 
 














Figure 4: Spatial distribution of Development Activity 
 
 




Figure 5 Illustration of Common Support 
 
 